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1. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. [A]ttorney [G]eneral is trying to prevent immigration au-
thorities from sending a Muslim woman to her home country, where
she was a victim of female genital mutilation. In a stinging order
overriding federal immigration courts, [Attorney General] Mukasey
blasted a decision that said a 28-year-old citizen and native of Mali
should be expelled "because her genitalia already had been muti-
lated [so] she had no basis to fear future persecution if returned to
her home country." Calling the rationale "flawed," Mukasey sent
the case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals with orders to
reconsider. The woman, a native of Mali, begged the court not to
send her back to her Bambara tribe. The 28-year-old said if she re-
turned and had a daughter, the child also would be subject to mutila-
tion. The woman also said she faced forced marriage if she had to go
home. Mukasey cited what he concluded were two significant factual
errors in the court's rejection of her appeal.'
The Mali woman's claim, in the case of In re A-T-,2 involves a form of
persecution referred to as female genital mutilation (FGM), which en-
compasses a wide range of procedures that involve the removal or altera-
tion of a woman's external genitalia for non-medical reasons.3 Women
persecuted this way make their way to the United States, but are denied
asylum due to the ambiguous asylum law. There is no doubt that women
1. Terry Frieden, AG: Don't Deport Genital Mutilation Victim, CNN.COM, Sept. 22,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLDlafrica/09/22/genital.mutiliation.immigrant/in-
dex.html (describing the order of Attorney General Mukasey). The Mali woman's claim
for asylum was denied by the Board of Immigration Appeals, but Attorney General
Mukasey intervened in the case where the Mali woman attempted to establish her asylum
claim based on membership in a particular social group-one that believes in conducting
female genital mutilation procedures. Id.
2. In re A-T-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008).
3. See Tiaji Salaam et al., Female Genital Mutilation (FGM): Background Information
and Issues for Congress 1 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress, Order Code
RS21923, Aug. 27, 2004) ("It is estimated that 2 million girls in the Middle East and Africa
are subjected to the procedure per year.").
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subjected to this treatment deserve protection. Yet the asylum provisions
and case law interpreting the law has instead created a confusing set of
hurdles to acquire the protection available.
FGM is classified into four main categories that range from partial or
total removal of the female organs to harmful procedures such as prick-
ing, piercing and scraping the female genitalia.4 FGM is also known by
various other names such as female genital cutting (FGC), female genital
alteration, or female circumcision, and it involves many different surgical
procedures.5 The World Health Organization estimates that currently
100 to 140 million women worldwide have undergone FGM with approxi-
mately 3 million girls in Africa at risk annually.6 FGM is a cultural prac-
tice prevalent in "western, eastern, and north-eastern regions of Africa,"
and in some Asian and Middle-Eastern nations.7 It is widely considered a
human rights violation by most international organizations and Western
countries, including the United States.'
The United States Attorney General rarely issues an opinion on a
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, and the In re A-T- opin-
4. World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation Fact Sheet, http://www.
who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241 /en/index.html (last visited May 11, 2009). The World
Health Organization (WHO) classifies the FGM procedures into the following four
categories:
[Type 1:1 Clitoridectomy: partial or total removal of the clitoris (a small, sensitive and
erectile part of the female genitals) and, rarely, the prepuce (the fold of skin surround-
ing the clitoris) as well.
[Type 2:] Excision: partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or
without excision of the labia majora (the labia are "the lips" that surround the vagina).
[Type 3:] Infibulation: narrowing of the vaginal opening through the creation of a cov-
ering seal. The seal is formed by cutting and repositioning the inner, and sometimes
outer, labia, with or without removal of the clitoris.
[Type 4:] Other: all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical
purposes, e.g. pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterizing the genital area. Id.
5. See United Nations Population Fund, Frequently Asked Questions on Female Gen-
ital Mutilation/Cutting, www.unfpa.org/gender/practices2.htm#8 (last visited May 11,
2009). The World Health Organization defines FGM as "all procedures that involve partial
or total removal of external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs
for non-medical reasons." World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation Fact
Sheet, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/index.html (last visited May 11,
2009).
6. WORLD HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN INTER-
AGENCY STATEMENT 1 (2008), http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/publications/fgm/
fgmstatement_2008.pdf.
7. World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation Fact Sheet, http://www.
who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/index.html (last visited May 11, 2009). Organiza-
tions such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the




ion, mentioned above, is based on two factual errors.9 The first is that
FGM is not a one-time act of persecution, but can be inflicted multiple
times." The second is that the BIA did not establish that the persecution
occurred on account of membership in a social group.'' Instead, the BIA
assumed there was a social group.' 2 These errors will be further ex-
amined throughout the Comment since, together, the errors are the para-
digm of conflict in this aspect of asylum law.
To understand the weight of Attorney General opinions, the BIA must
also be explained to some degree. The BIA is not a federal court, but
issues administrative decisions that are binding on the immigration com-
munity and subject to judicial review by federal courts.' 3 The immigra-
tion courts decide approximately 40,000 cases a year.' 4 The Attorney
General "has issued an opinion on a case only three times in the past
three years."' 5  Although FGM-based claims have recently received
much attention, the conflict surrounding gender-based claims developed
over fifty years ago. In 1951, the United Nations drafted the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter: Convention), which is the
national authority defining a refugee and the responsibility of countries
9. Terry Frieden, AG: Don't Deport Genital Mutilation Victim, CNN.COM, Sept. 22,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/09/22/genital.mutiliation.immigrant/index.
html.
10. See In re A-T-, 24 1. & N. at 621 ("[T]he Board [of Immigration Appeals] based
its analysis on a false premise: that female genital mutilation is a 'one-time' act that cannot
be repeated on the same woman."). Many courts recognized that FGM can be repeated.
Id.; see also In re S-A-K- and H-A-H-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 464,465 (B.I.A. 2008) (explaining
that the applicant's "vaginal opening was sewn shut" about five times "after being opened
to allow for sexual intercourse and child birth").
11. See In re A-T-, 24 1. & N. at n.6 (directing the Board to revisit or clarify "whether
a fear of future harm is 'related' to past persecution on account of membership in a partic-
ular social group," which the Board did not do in this case). Determining membership in a
particular social group will often require, as a threshold matter, defining what the particu-
lar social group is. Id.
12. Id. at 620 ("The Board assumed arguendo that respondent in the present case was,
like the applicant in Kasinga, a member of a particular social group.").
13. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, BIA Decisions, http://www.uscis.
govlportal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6dla/?vgnextoid=f2c29c77
55cb90lOVgnVCM 10000045f3d6al RCRD&vgnextchannel=f2c29c7755cb9OlOVgnVCM10
000045f3d6alRCRD (last visited May 12, 2009) ("Decisions of the BIA are binding on all
DHS officers and Immigration Judges unless modified or overruled by the Attorney Gen-
eral or a Federal court.").
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granting asylum.16 There are a number of grounds for asylum applicants'
claims that would trigger international protection from persecution, but
none of them include gender or sex.' 7 Some experts reason there is not
an overwhelming need for an express reference as long as the Convention
is interpreted without discrimination against women. 8
Most of the gender issues that arise in asylum claims concern women.
According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees
(UNHCR), around 74% of the worldwide refugee claims are for women
and children. 9 Additionally, in numerous societies, women are power-
less, which makes them vulnerable.2" In turn, they become easy targets
for persecution and other harm.2 Many societies condone such treat-
ment and some governments overlook the situations entirely. 2 Males
comprise most of the refugee population since they are more able to
travel to industrialized countries.23 Consequently, asylum procedures
have sometimes developed to implicitly respond to male experiences.24
Since there is little indication that states would modify the 1951 Conven-
tion to add an additional protected ground specifically for gender or sex,
the reality is that the immigration community will continue to grapple
with these gender issues within the already constructed framework. 5
Those protected grounds of asylum are limited to the following: race, re-
16. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signa-
ture July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
17. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2006) (defining the term "refugee"). The applicant must be "unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of that country because of the persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group or political opinion." Id.
18. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEE PROTECTION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 326-27 (Erika Feller, Volker Turk, & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003)
("The text, object, and purpose of the 1951 Convention require a gender-inclusive and
gender-sensitive interpretation."). "[A] misconceived interpretation can reflect and rein-
force gender biases leading to the marginalization of women in the refugee context." Id.
19. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'N ON REFUGEES, UNHCR STATISTICAL YEAR-
1300K 2007, POPULATION LEVELS AND TRENDS 34 (2008), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?id=4981c3252&tbl=STATISTICS (showing how women make
up for 47% of asylum seekers and children make up 27% of asylum seekers).
20. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
PROCESS AND POLICY 902-03 (6th ed. 2008).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 903.
24. See id.
25. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
PROCESS AND POLICY 902 (6th ed. 2008).
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ligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political
opinion.2 6 Women and children regularly use the "membership in a par-
ticular social group" ground when seeking asylum for gender-based
claims.
27
When and how do women or certain sub-sets of women comprise a
particular social group? Sometimes they are successful at establishing
their social group and sometimes they are not. The definition of "social
group" is broad yet defined narrowly by decision makers. So, the victim-
ized women are left with an unpredictable hurdle they hope to overcome
when applying for asylum in the United States. Women who fear under-
going FGM can constitute a social group as long as they can prove that
they belong to a tribe or clan that practices FGM.2 8 The recent decision
by Attorney General Mukasey seems to pronounce that even women
who have undergone FGM may constitute a social group.29 Part of the
BIA's flawed decision is due to the focus on the FGM as a form of perse-
cution rather than the social group that widely practices that form of per-
secution.30 The Attorney General's direction to the BIA forces it to
address the broader issue about what constitutes a social group in the
FGM context.3 Although case law already established that FGM may
serve as a form of persecution, if the precedent changes upon the Board's
review of In re A-T-, that could have dire consequences on the women
seeking asylum due to persecution by FGM and potentially even other
gender-based claims such as claims based on domestic violence.
The question now becomes what is the social group for women who
have undergone FGM and how should that be decided? This Comment
will expose the difficulties of defining a social group and focus on how
female genital mutilation victims establish their membership in a particu-
lar social group. Finally, it will propose a solution where membership in a
particular social group is avoided altogether for victims of FGM.
26. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
27. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357, 377 (B.I.A. 1996) (considering gender-
based asylum claims "within the 'membership in a particular social group' construct").
28. See id. at 365-66 (recognizing that "young women of the Tachamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by the Tribe, and who oppose the practice"
constitute a social group).
29. See In re A-T-, 24 1. & N. at 621.
In the present case, the Board rejected a claim for withholding of removal by a woman
who had previously been subjected to female genital mutilation, reasoning that be-
cause her genitalia already had been mutilated she had no basis to fear future persecu-
tion if returned to her home country. For the reasons stated below, I conclude that
this decision was flawed .... Id.
30. See id. at 622 (comparing this situation to one faced in another case where the
court did find that victims of FGM were members of a particular social group).
31. See id. at 623.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of Refugee and Asylum Law
Asylum is not an everyday discussion topic, although the topic has
sprung up recently since Iraqis continue seeking asylum in the United
States.32 The initial discussion and development of refugees percolated at
the conclusion of World War 11.33 That time was the impetus for asylum
efforts made internationally, particularly for Jewish refugees 34 seeking
protection in the United States and in many other countries.3 5 For the
next three decades following the War, in the United States there was leg-
islation and special programs enacted for displaced persons. The 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, an international legal in-
strument defining refugees, was adopted by the United Nations, which
solidified the international efforts.36 The United States signed onto the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, binding the country to
the international treaty's substantive provisions of this Convention.37
Landmark legislation enacted in the United States two years before the
United States became a signatory to the aforementioned Protocol abol-
ished the previous quota system and adopted a provision admitting num-
bers of overseas refugees who had fled a "Communist or Communist-
dominated country."3 8 At this time in history, there was a world-wide
32. See Fewer Iraqis Seeking Asylum, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at A3 (reporting that
approximately 20,000 Iraqis applied for asylum in the first six months of 2008).
33. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
PROCESS AND POLICY 847 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing that "[t]here was little systematic at-
tention in the United States to providing asylum to refugees prior to the end of World War
II"). The focus of the 1951 Convention was on the situation of European countries harbor-
ing millions of displaced persons who had been uprooted and were unlikely to leave their
new country of residence. Id. at 846. The Convention's major purpose was to clarify ques-
tions surrounding the status of these refugees already in place. Id.
34. See id.
35. See generally JOHN HOPE SIMPSON, THE REFUGEE PROBLEM (1939) (explaining
how the refugee law developed along with the challenges associated with this new realm of
protection).
36. See generally UN HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVEN-
TION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2007), http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/3c0f495f4.
pdf (describing the reasons and protections for the refugee Convention).
37. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signa-
ture July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
38. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79
Stat. 911, 913 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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effort to provide necessary protection for deserving persons, and that is
the basis for the development of refugee and asylum law.
39
The word "asylum" did not appear in United States law until 1980, with
the enactment of The Refugee Act of 1980.40 Prior to that year, someone
could be considered a refugee, which was determined before entering the
United States.4 ' The Act established the "asylum status" which allowed
for an asylee to remain in the United States indefinitely.42 It was a status
granted when the person was either at the United States border or al-
ready inside the country.43 More recently, asylum law developed with the
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act passed by Congress in 2001, which
expanded the bars to asylum.4 4 Even more recently, the Real ID Act of
2005 added requirements for credibility determinations in asylum
claims. 4 5 The heart of asylum law, however, relates to how refugee status
39. See UN HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION: QUES-
TIONS AND ANSWERS, http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/3cOf495f4.pdf.
40. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (establishing standards for assistance to refugees); see
also REGINA GERMAIN, AILA's ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM
LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (5th ed. 2007) (mentioning that the Act "created a legal frame-
work for refugees to apply from abroad and for asylum-seekers to apply from within the
United States").
41. See REGINA GERMAIN, AILA's ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIIE TO U.S.
ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 24 (5th ed. 2007).
42. See JOSEPH A. VAIL, ESSENTIALS OF REMOVAL ANI) RELIEF: REPRESENTING IN-
DIVIDUALS IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 139 (2006) (stating that an applicant for asylum
"must prove he or she is also unable or unwilling to return to the country of nationality, or
if homeless, of last habitual residence, and is unable or unwilling to avail him- or herself
the persecution of that country").
43. See id. (requiring only that the person be out of country he or she is seeking refuge
from).
44. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, (USA PATRIOT Act) Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 ("An act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the US and around the world, to
enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and other purposes.").
45. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, §101(a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. 231,
302-03 (2005) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006)).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact
may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant's or witness's ac-
count, the consistency between the applicant's or witness's written and oral statements
(whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances
under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such state-
ment, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the
reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or
falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy,
or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim, or any other relevant factor.
There is no presumption of credibility, however, if no adverse credibility determina-
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and asylum are closely linked because to be eligible for asylum in the
United States a noncitizen or alien must satisfy the statutory definition of
refugee.46 This Comment will focus on asylum, in particular, although it
is important to understand the three main persecution-based forms of re-
lief for asylum seekers.
B. Statutory Requirements for Asylum
For practical purposes, persons in the United States applying for asy-
lum also apply for withholding of removal and protection under the Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT).4 7 CAT is not normally thought of as
traditional refugee law, and therefore, gender-based claims generally are
afforded protection under either asylum or withholding of removal.4 8
The great benefit of being granted asylum is fully understood when com-
pared to another form of relief, withholding of removal. It is usually a
companion form of relief to asylum4 9 and is a mandatory form of relief
with more stringent statutory requirements50 that affords less protec-
tion is explicitly made, the applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of
credibility on appeal. Id.
46. See REGINA GERMAIN, AILA's ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S.
ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 25 (5th ed. 2007) ("Under §208(b) of the INA, the
[A]ttorney [G]eneral (AG) may, in his or her discretion, grant asylum to an individual who
qualifies as a 'refugee' within the meaning of INA §101(a)(42).").
47. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (proscribing various methods of torture
that member states must abide by); see DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE
UNIrED STATES 2-7 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 3d. ed. 1999) ("[Alsylum status, withholding pro-
tection, and refugee status are based on provisions of the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees.").
48. See DE13ORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999) (discussing the Convention Against Torture). Rooted in interna-
tional human rights law, CAT relief fundamentally prohibits torture and nonrefoulement is
absolute. Id. There is a higher standard to prove harm since torture is the harshest form of
persecution. Id. In other words, there are types of persecution that do not rise to the level
to qualify as torture. Id. CAT relief is evolving and it is critical as it "fills protection
lacunae in the refugee law regime." Id.
49. See id. at 5 (stating that an applicant for asylum also is considered an applicant for
withholding of removal as "promulgated pursuant to the statute"). Withholding of re-
moval is also based on the 1951 Convention's article 33 obligation of nonrefoulement or
non-return. Id.
50. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006)
("[Tihe Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General
decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the




tion.51 This type of relief does not allow for the adjustment of status or
the ability to bring in family members.5"
When granted asylum, the asylees are allowed to work, to bring in im-
mediate family members to the United States, and to access some public
assistance.53 They are also permitted to adjust their status to that of a
legal permanent resident (LPR) after a year in the United States. 54 Seek-
ing asylum can be accomplished upon arrival into the United States or it
may be raised as a defense during a removal proceeding.5 5 The alien
56
has the burden of proof to demonstrate that he or she meets the eligibility
requirements for asylum.57 The applicant must have filed the application
within one year of arriving into the United States if he or she is seeking
asylum affirmatively rather than defensively. 58 Therefore, asylum is the
first preference when seeking relief from removal from the United States.
As mentioned earlier, the requirements for asylum are derived from
the definition of refugee, and those requirements are numerous. The ap-
plicant must establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. 59 Relief
with withholding of removal requires the applicant show a "clear
51. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 5-6 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999) (describing withholding of removal protection). "Withholding
only protects a person from return to the country of persecution"; it does not allow for the
person to remain in the United States under a certain status. Id.
52. See generally Yule Kim, Female Genital Mutilation as Persecution: When Can It
Constitute a Basis for Asylum and Withholding of Removal? 4-5 (Cong. Research Serv.
CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL345878, Oct. 10 2008), available at http://as-
sets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34587_20081010.pdf (explaining the disadvantages of withholding
of removal).
53. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999).
54. See id.
55. Yule Kim, Female Genital Mutilation as Persecution: When Can It Constitute a Ba-
sis for Asylum and Withholding of Removal? 2 (Cong. Research Serv. CRS Report for
Congress, Order Code RL345878, Oct. 10 2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL34587_20081010.pdf.
56. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006) (defin-
ing an alien as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States").
57. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2003) ("The burden of proof is on the applicant for asylum
to establish that he or she is a refugee as defined in section 101(a)(42) of the [Immigration
and Nationality] Act.").
58. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006)
(stating the time limit in which an asylum applicant must file an application); see DEBORAH
E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999);
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND
POLICY 849-851 (6th ed. 2008).
59. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006)
(stating the eligibility requirements for granting asylum, which hinges on meeting the defi-
nition of "refugee"); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (defining the term "refugee" and in-
cluding the requirement of having a "well-founded fear of persecution").
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probability" of future persecution.6" There are also various bars and inel-
igibility grounds, which are primarily based on the 1951 Convention.6'
For asylum claims, the applicant must show three things: (1) he or she has
a "well-founded fear of persecution," (2) the persecution was on account
of a protected ground, and (3) he or she belongs to the protected ground,
those being race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.62 The protected grounds are all important for
various asylum claims and sometimes overlap, but for this discussion, the
focus will be on membership in a particular social group.
C. Membership in a Particular Social Group
"Membership in a particular social group" was a phrase added as an
"afterthought" to the definition of refugee while the 1951 Convention
was being considered.63 A representative from Sweden proposed this
language since "experience has shown that certain refugees had been per-
secuted because they belonged to particular social groups. ''64 The lan-
guage was adopted as an avenue to persons who would otherwise not be
provided protection by the newly formed refugee law.65
A four-part test determining a particular social group claim was devel-
oped to help interpret what qualified as a particular social group.66 Com-
ponents of the test were that the applicant must (1) identify a cognizable
social group; (2) prove that the applicant is a group member; (3) prove
that the persecution is aimed at one of the group's unifying characteris-
tics; and (4) show "special circumstances" that merit the recognition of a
group-based claim. 67 The first social group to be denied under the test
included "young, urban, working class males" in El Salvador.68 The court
60. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984) ("We now reverse and hold that an
alien must establish a clear probability of persecution to avoid deportation under § 243(h)
[of the Immigration and Nationality Act]."); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006) (stating
that aliens should not be removed by the Attorney General if their lives have been
threatened in their country of origin because of their "race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion").
61. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999).
62. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
63. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PRO-
CESS AND POLICY 906 (6th ed. 2008).
64. Id.
65. See generally Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Employing the
doctrine of ejusdem generis, the Board then reasoned that a particular social group refers
to "a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.").
66. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574-75 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Ri-
vera-Castaneda v. INS, 6 F. App'x. 604, 605 (9th Cir. 2001).
67. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576-77.
68. Id. at 1575.
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that created this test also held that "the phrase 'particular social group'
implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are
actuated by some common impulse or interest. '"69
Later, membership in a particular social group was elaborated on in In
re Acosta.7 ° The focus shifted from a "voluntary association" to what the
BIA construed as a finding that all persons who belonged to a protected
group shared a "common immutable characteristic."' 7' Asylum would
only be granted by the BIA if the persecution was aimed at the "common
immutable characteristic," one that "should not be required to change
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. "72
Most federal appellate courts have adopted this construction. 73 Gender
and sex are also considered immutable characteristics. Gender, however,
is successfully used when it is only part of the social group characteris-
tic. 74 In Acosta, the Board mentioned sex as an innate characteristic that
could link the members of a social group.7
D. Female Genital Mutilation as Persecution and Past Persecution
Now discussion turns to how FGM has been handled in the realm of
asylum law. FGM is gender persecution where the claimants typically use
69. Id. at 1576.
70. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (interpreting the phrase
"membership in a particular social group"). The phrase was interpreted as the following:
[Plersecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of
persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared character-
istic might be an innate one such as sex, color, kinship ties, or in some circumstances it
might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or landowner-
ship. The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this construc-
tion remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, members of the
group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is funda-
mental to their individual identities or consciences. Id.
71. Id. (discussing the elements of common immutable characteristics). "We find the
well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis, meaning literally, 'of the same kind,' to be
most helpful in construing the phrase 'membership in a particular social group."' Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d
1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546-48 (6th Cir.
2003); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Gonzalez, 409 F.3d 1177,
87 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a family could constitute a membership in a particular
social group).
74. See e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Possession of broadly-
based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with
membership in a particular group.").
75. In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. at 233 (listing "sex" as one of the factors that could be
considered as a shared characteristic of a persecuted group).
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"membership in a particular social group" as the protected ground.7 6 De-
cision makers, such as immigration judges, federal courts and the BIA,
strive to properly employ the definition of refugee, while many times be-
coming fixated on the other necessary elements, such as what constitutes
persecution, rather than establishing if and how the applicant belongs to a
particular social group.7 7 Most recently, the issue of whether FGM, as
past persecution, is a basis for relief has been highlighted by stances taken
by the BIA, the federal circuits and the United States Attorney Gen-
eral.78 The reasoning by all three bodies sets the stage for the future
while highlighting the complexities and difficulties of the law.
In re Kasinga 71 set the initial precedent for how a woman can establish
her social group.8" Generally, an applicant who fears undergoing FGM
describes herself as a woman with a tribal membership to meet the re-
quirement of membership in a particular social group.8 The BIA in In re
Kasinga granted the applicant asylum based on defining her social group
as one constituting "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe who
have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the prac-
tice." 8 Stated simply, the holding applied to women who had not under-
gone any FGM procedure and who were also members of a tribe. "In
accordance with Acosta, the particular social group is defined by common
characteristics that ... either cannot change, or should not be required to
change because such characteristics are fundamental to their individual
76. See DE13ORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 388 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999) ("[G]ender-based claims by women may require analysis under the
particular social group ground.").
77. See In re A-T-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 617, 621 (A.G. 2008) (analyzing how the lower
courts look at the issue of persecution and finding that the argument based on the false
premise that FGM can only occur one time skews the court's basis for finding a lack of
threat of future persecution).
78. See id. (finding that the denial of asylum for a woman who underwent FGM in
her home country was flawed); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Petition-
ers, three women from Guinea who underwent female genital mutilation in the past, peti-
tion for review of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals ('BIA') affirming, inter
alia, the denial of their claims for withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture
('CAT') relief based on female genital mutilation."); Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d
785, 794 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering whether the failure of petitioner's counsel to raise
claim of FGM affected the outcome of the proceedings).
79. 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
80. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that FGM can be
a basis for asylum).
81. See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that fe-
male members of a tribe would be a social group applying the definition of social group
defined in Acosta). The focus of the claim should be whether the members of the group
are likely to be persecuted "on account of" membership with the group. Id.
82. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. at 365.
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identities., 8 3 In this case, having "intact genitalia is one [characteristic]
that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that
she should not be required to change it."8 4 Thus, the BIA seemed to
require a particular social group consist of "(1) women (2) who person-
ally opposed FGM, (3) did not undergo FGM, and (4) who belonged to a
particular tribe that (5) practiced FGM".85 However, most courts rely
heavily on gender combined with nationality or tribal affiliation to define
a social group. 6
Background on the other conflicts pertaining to FGM claims must be
explained to understand the most recent developments. Further exami-
nation of case law shows the marked split between the federal courts and
the BIA when addressing FGM as past persecution.87 This controversy
does not involve any of the protected grounds as much as it begins to
focus on the other elements of the refugee/asylum definition. The leading
federal appellate case on the treatment of FGM as past persecution is
Mohammed v. Gonzales.88 The asylum applicant in this case was a wo-
man from Somalia who had already been inflicted with FGM.8 9 Again,
her gender combined with her specific clan satisfied her membership in
particular social group. According to the BIA, the woman, however, had
not established a well-founded fear of future persecution.9 ° In order to
show well-founded fear there must be (1) a past incident that rises to the
level of persecution (2) that is on the account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a social group, or political opinion, and is (3) commit-
83. Id. at 366 (acknowledging that being a "young woman" and also a member of a
particular tribe could not be changed)
84. Id.
85. Yule Kim, Female Genital Mutilation as Persecution: When Can It Constitute a Ba-
sis for Asylum and Withholding of Removal? 14 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for
Congress, Order Code RL345878, Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/RL34587_20081010.pdf (explaining the BIA's interpretation of the class of women
who based asylum claims on FGM).
86. See In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. at 365 (setting the precedent for a female member of
a tribe opposed to the practice of FGM constituting a social group).
87. Yule Kim, Female Genital Mutilation as Persecution: When Can It Constitute a Ba-
sis for Asylum and Withholding of Removal? (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Con-
gress, Order Code RL345878, Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL34587_20081010.pdf (explaining the split between the BIA and the federal courts re-
garding whether FGM can occur repeatedly or just once).
88. Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he question before
us is whether first counsel's failure to present evidence of Mohamed's past genital mutila-
tion 'may have affected the outcome of the proceedings."').
89. Id. (acknowledging that the petitioner's FGM was "supported by documentary
evidence-medical evidence of her genital mutilation").
90. Id. at 799 (arguing that the Mohammed had undergone FGM and therefore had
no chance that she would be "personally tortured by the procedure" in the future).
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ted by the government or by forces the government is either unable or
unwilling to control.91 The government can rebut a claim if it can show
there "has been a fundamental change in circumstances" so that the ap-
plicant no longer has either a well-founded fear in the asylum context or a
clear probability of persecution in the withholding of removal context.92
In Mohammed, the woman's claim of FGM satisfied that she had suf-
fered from past persecution, which warranted a presumption that she had
a well-founded fear of future persecution.93 The government, however,
argued that past infliction of FGM was a fundamental change in the cir-
cumstances which should have rebutted the presumption of future perse-
cution. 94 In other words, having suffered FGM, the applicant would not
be inflicted with the procedure in the future.95 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected the government's argument.96 Instead, the court
analogized FGM to forced sterilization. 97 Forced sterilization is classified
91. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655-656 (9th Cir. 2000).
92. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(l)(i)(A) (2003) (stating that a discretionary denial is appro-
priate when, supported by the preponderance of the evidence, "[tihere has been a funda-
mental change in circumstances"); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(l)(i)(A) (2000) (stating that a
presumption that an applicant's life would be threatened in the future could be rebutted if
it is found "[t]here has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the appli-
cant's life or freedom would not be threatened").
93. Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 798 ("Once a petitioner demonstrates past persecution
within the definition of the Act, she is entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of
future persecution.").
94. Id. (arguing that because Mohammed has already suffered FGM, she is ineligible
for asylum because there was no chance of future persecution).
95. Id. ("[T]here is no chance that she would be personally tortured again by the pro-
cedure." (quoting Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 2003)).
96. Id. ("The government's position is not supported by either the BIA's precedent or
our own opinions in analogous circumstances.").
97. Id. at 799.
[P]ersecution in the form of female genital mutilation is similar to forced sterilization
and, like that other persecutory technique, must be considered a continuing harm that
renders a petitioner eligible for asylum, without more. That is, the individual who
endures sterilization does not need to have a fear of the same persecution recurring in
the future in order to be eligible for withholding of removal. Rather, we have held
that forced sterilization "should not be viewed as a discrete, onetime act, comparable
to a term in prison, or an incident of severe beating or even torture. Coerced steriliza-
tion is better viewed as a permanent and continuing act of persecution that has de-
prived a couple of the natural fruits of conjugal life...." "[S]uch a permanent and
continuing form of persecution requires a special result under the asylum regulations,
namely that applicants who have suffered forced or involuntary sterilization necessa-
rily have an inherent well-founded fear of future persecution because such persons




as a continuing impairment that renders an individual eligible for with-
holding of removal, without more.9 8
In a subsequent case, Hassan v. Gonzales,9 9 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed with the Ninth Circuit, except that it left the presumption
of future persecution rebuttable even though the court believed FGM in-
flicted in the past was sufficient to create a presumption of a well-
founded fear of persecution. °0 The court found that even though the
risk of future FGM is slight, that does not negate the possibility that the
applicant could suffer from other forms of persecution.' 0' In essence, this
case holds that past infliction of FGM does not create a fundamental
change in the circumstances. The BIA disagrees with theories that FGM
could be a continuing harm.'0 2 Obviously the split in the courts did not
occur due to disagreement with what constituted membership in a partic-
ular social group; the conflict surrounded how and when FGM rises to the
level of persecution to satisfy as an asylum claim.'0 3 What seemed to
settle the idea that gender combined with clan or tribal affiliation fulfilled
the protected ground requirement to provide relief did not clear up the
controversy surrounding this type of asylum claim.'0 4 Both issues-ad-
dressing what satisfies membership in a particular social group and deter-
mining if FGM warrants past persecution without changing
circumstances-came to a head just before the Attorney General
intervened.
98. See Qili Qu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005) (characterizing forced
sterilization as a form of permanent and continuous persecution which creates an irrebut-
table presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution).
Involuntary sterilization irrevocably strips persons of one of the important liberties we
possess as humans: our reproductive freedom. Therefore, one who has suffered invol-
untary sterilization, either directly or because of the sterilization of a spouse, is enti-
tled, without more, to withholding of removal. Id.
99. 484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007).
100. Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Hassan's establishment
of past persecution creates a presumption that she also possesses a well-founded fear of
future persecution.")
101. Id. (explaining the error in the government's argument where FGM is the only
potential form of persecution at risk for the petitioner).
102. See id. at 518-19 (indicating that an FGM victim might be eligible for asylum but
not based on the threat of a future FGM, or for the threat of an FGM procedure on her
daughter, but rather on some other persecution faced by the individual).
103. See id. at 518 (agreeing with sister courts that FGM procedures are categorized as
persecution).
104. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 795 (acknowledging that FGM implicates fears of
future persecution).
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E. Recent Developments in FGM-Based Cases
In In re A-T-, the BIA upheld an immigration judge who denied an
applicant's request for withholding of removal 10 5 because essentially the
BIA assumed that the respondent from Mali was a member of a social
group but "the respondent failed to present evidence that it is more likely
than not that she would be tortured if she returned to Mali."' 10 6 The BIA
held that the past infliction of FGM was by itself a "fundamental change
in the circumstances" that rebutted the regulatory presumption of future
harm.0 7 Thus, the BIA rejected the applicant's argument that FGM
qualified as "continuing persecution" to qualify her as a refugee.'0 8 A
regulation was cited by the BIA which states that "[i]f the applicant's fear
of future persecution is unrelated to past persecution, the applicant bears
the burden of establishing that the fear is well-founded."'0 9 Summarily,
there must be a showing of past persecution to create a well-founded fear
of identical future persecution.1 °0 Therefore, the analysis of the regula-
tion was that the removal of female genitalia can only be performed once,
and consequently, the "very act of persecution itself effects a fundamen-
tal change in circumstances that negates the possibility of future
persecution."''11
The Second Circuit responded to the holding of In re A-T-. In Bah v.
Mukasey, the Second Circuit agreed with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,
"which have previously rejected facets of the reasoning the BIA now ad-
vances on this front." ' 2 The court found that the BIA erred when apply-
ing the withholding of removal regulatory framework to FGM claims and
that the BIA mischaracterized FGM as a "one-time" act.' 13 The court
105. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296 (B.I.A. 2007), vacated, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (A.G.
2008).
106. Id. at 304 (concluding that the applicant did not meet her burden of showing a
clear probability that she would be persecuted based on her rejection of an arranged mar-
riage in her home country of Mali).
107. Id. at 299.
108. Id. at 304.
109. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2007))
110. See Yule Kim, Female Genital Mutilation as Persecution: When Can It Constitute a
Basis for Asylum and Withholding of Removal? 19 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for
Congress, Order Code RL345878, Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/RL3458720081010.pdf (explaining the BIA's insistence that the future fear be based
on identical persecution).
111. Id. (explaining the BIA's argument against the idea that "a showing of FGM can
create a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution").
112. Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, Ill (2d Cit. 2008) (describing how previous FGM
did not show future harm would happen).
113. Id. at 114 (showing error in characterizing FGM as a single act, and for disregard-
ing other types of persecution).
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explained, "Nothing in the regulation suggests that the future threats to
life or freedom must come in the same form or be the same act as the past
persecution."'14 The court noted that the government cannot rely only
on showing that "a particular act of persecution suffered by the victim
will not recur."'" 5 Domestic abuse, rape, and sex trafficking were other
types of abuse petitioners could face when returning to their country of
origin. 16
Most recently, the BIA provided relief to women who have undergone
FGM; however, the relief was based solely on humanitarian grounds.
That is how the BIA ruled in In re S-A-K- & H-A-H-" 7 based on pre-
cedent from In re Chen." 8 In In re Chen, the BIA ruled that a past perse-
cution rose to such a severe level to qualify as a basis for asylum.'19
Hearing loss and psychological difficulties were experienced by the re-
spondent after being punished by the Chinese Red Guard. 20 At the time
of the respondent's case, though, the Chinese government had altered its
abusive policies.1 2' However, the BIA held that the past persecution was
so severe it satisfied a claim for asylum even though a well-founded fear
of future persecution was not established. 22 Thus, the BIA seems to
treat FGM claims the same-as a basis for asylum without the well-
founded fear component being necessary. 123
Attorney General Mukasey's response to the BIA's decision in In re
A-T- exposes the ongoing struggle to ensure membership in a particular
114. Id. at 115 (claiming that the statute makes no requirement that future persecu-
tion be of the same nature).
115. Id. (showing how the inability to be persecuted in one way does not preclude
other types of persecution).
116. Id. at 116 ("The government in these cases did not even attempt to argue that
petitioners would not be subject to forms of persecution other than genital mutilation on
account of their membership in particular social groups upon return to Guinea.").
117. In re S-A-K- & H-A-H-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 464, 465 (B.I.A. 2008) (sustaining
respondent's appeal based on humanitarian grounds in place of a well-founded fear of
persecution).
118. 20 1. & N. Dec. 16 (B.I.A. 1989).
119. In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 21 (B.I.A. 1989) (describing how the respondent's
family suffered a considerable amount of ill-treatment based on his family's strong relig-
ious convictions, which was enough to find him statutorily eligible for asylum).
120. Id. at 20 (explaining how the respondent and his family became the target of the
Red Guards on account of his father's occupation as a Christian minister).
121. Id. at 21 (noting that conditions have dramatically changed since the time of the
Cultural Revolution in China).
122. Id. at 21.
123. Yule Kim, Female Genital Mutilation as Persecution: When Can It Constitute a
Basis for Asylum and Withholding of Removal? 20, 21-22 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS
Report for Congress, Order Code RL345878, Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://assets.open
crs.com/rpts/RL34587_20081010.pdf.
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social group is met as well as addressing the BIA's flawed reasoning.124
Attorney General Mukasey issued a "stinging order" in In re A-T- in an
attempt to prevent immigration authorities from deporting a woman who
had undergone FGM from being returned to her home country.' 25 The
Attorney General's opinion vacated the BIA's decision and remanded it
to the BIA for reconsideration.' 26 The opinion stated that the BIA erred
in applying regulatory framework regarding future harm. 27 Specifically,
the opinion argued that if the respondent could demonstrate past perse-
cution because of a protected ground, then she would be entitled to the
"mandatory presumption" that her life would be threatened in the future
on the basis of her original claim.' 28 The opinion hones in on a different
aspect of the BIA's flawed reasoning. The law requires that when an
alien demonstrates that she suffered past persecution on account of one
of the statutory bases, there is a presumption that her life and freedom
will be threatened in the future on the "same statutory ground.' 29 Thus,
the original claim is not FGM but rather "persecution on account of
membership in a particular (albeit not clearly defined) social group." 130
The government would then have to show that the changed circum-
stances stem from the social group rather than show that the same type of
persecution would not recur.' 3 ' Last, there is direction given to first de-
cide if the applicant "established persecution on account of membership
in a particular social group, rather than assuming it" since that is "funda-
124. Terry Frieden, AG: Don't deport genital mutilation Victim, CNN.COM, Sept. 22,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/09/22/genital.mutiliation.immigrant/index.
html.
125. See id. (reporting on the circumstances surrounding the BIA's order in In re
A-T-).
126. See In re A-T-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 617, 621 (A.G. 2008) (vacating and remanding
the BIA's decision for reconsideration concerning the woman's eligibility for withholding
of removal based on her claim of FGM).
127. Id. at 622 ("Given this factual error, there was no basis for the Board's legal
conclusion that the past infliction of female genital mutilation by itself rebuts '[a]ny pre-
sumption of future [female genital mutilation] persecution."').
128. Id. (stating how the statutory framework should be properly interpreted and ap-
plied in this case).
129. Id. (stating the presumption that one's future persecution will be the same as that
person's past persecution suffered).
130. Id. (explaining that the original claim was not FGM persecution, but rather based
on the applicant's membership in a particular social group).
131. See In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. at 622.
[It was the Government's burden to show "that changed conditions obviate[d] the
risk to life or freedom related to the original claim"-here, persecution on account of
membership in the particular social group-not to show "that the particular act of
persecution suffered by the victim in the past will not recur." Id. (citing Bah v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 115 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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mental to the analysis of which party bears the burden of proof and what
that burden is." '13 2 Essentially, the Attorney General pointed out that the
flaw originated from the Board's assumption on the issue of the respon-
dent belonging to a particular social group.
133
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS I
Women subjected to such inhumane mistreatment such as FGM or
other gender-based violence, such as domestic violence, should be
granted relief of asylum without having to meet unrealistic and confusing
definitions and applications of asylum law. Contention surrounding the
application of membership of a particular social group has existed since
"social group" was included in the 1951 Convention more than fifty years
ago. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not define the
term, although it was intended to be interpreted broadly to include
groups of people who should be protected by international refugee laws,
but who may not be protected on any other ground.' 34 The United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines social group as
"persons of similar background[s], habits or social status." 13 5 The United
States created the law to protect those who cannot protect themselves,
except now the decision makers use the protected ground of membership
in a particular social group as a means to avoid granting asylum by mak-
ing the qualification impossible to satisfy-either because of the broad-
ness of the definition that was initially given or due to their own overly
narrow interpretations.
A. Reluctant Reliance on Membership in a Particular Social Group
Membership in a particular social group is seen as the most "elusive" of
the five protected grounds.'3 6 The difference between how "social
group" was originally defined and how it is further defined by decision
makers demonstrates why certain victimized women groups are having
132. Id. at 624 n.7 (clarifying that immigration courts should determine whether the
applicant is a member of a particular social group as opposed to assuming it as the BIA did
in this case).
133. Id. at 623 (emphasizing this point because in assuming membership in a particu-
lar social group, the BIA missed the point on the proper statutory analysis).
134. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HAND1300K ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND
THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 13 (1992), http://www.
unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58e13b4.pdf (defining social group for the purpose of refugees).
135. Id.
136. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALIENIKOF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
PROCESS AND POLICY 897 (6th ed. 2008) ("During the past decade the number of attempts
to give meaning to this phrase seems to have increased geometrically.").
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difficulty establishing a social group. 137 The term "social group" was in-
tended to be construed broadly, but continues to be more narrowly de-
fined, thus leaving women unsuccessful establishing their own social
group.
138
Even with most circuit courts having adopted the In re Acosta test,
which requires that the common characteristic "be one that members of
the group cannot change or should not be required to change,"' 39 which
groups actually qualify and do not qualify illustrate why there is a need
for a workable definition or another alternative for victimized women.
Some of the groups that qualify as a social group in various other asylum
claims include the educated, landowning class of Colombian cattle farm-
ers,'4 ° former child soldiers,' families,' 42 persons with disabilities,
43
members of a Somali clan, 14 4 and homosexuals. 4 5 Other groups that did
not qualify with the facts presented in their respective case are the follow-
137. See generally DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
379-81 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 3d ed. t999).
138. See id.; see also Stephanie Kaye Pell, Comment, Adjudication of Gender Persecu-
tion Cases Under the Canada Guidelines: The United States Has No Reason to Fear an
Onslaught of Asylum Claims, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 655, 658-59 (1995) (assert-
ing that American courts have "narrowly defined the categories of persecution, such as
Imembership in a particular social group'" to ensure that refugees numbers are controlled
in the United States).
139. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 214 (B.I.A. 1985) (articulating the test to satisfy
membership in particular social group that is currently used today and adopted by the
First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits).
140. Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Applying
this social group test from Acosta, the Orejuelas fall into a distinct social group: the edu-
cated, landowning class of cattle farmers targeted by [Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia].").
141. Ang. v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2005) (allowing for the social group
but denying the claim for not showing past persecution or well-founded fear).
142. See Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The BIA has long rec-
ognized that 'kinship ties' may form a cognizable shared characteristic for a particular so-
cial group.").
143. Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 118t, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining
"persons with disabilities are precisely the kind of individuals that our asylum law contem-
plates by the words, 'particular social group'"), vacated, 549 U.S. 801 (2006). The Supreme
Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in light of Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183
(2006). Gonzales v. Tchoukhrova, 549 U.S. 801 (2006).
144. In re H-, 211. & N. Dec. 337, 342-43 (B.I.A. 1996) ("The Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service Basic Law Manual on asylum adjudications cites a December 9, 1993,
legal opinion of the Office of the INS General Counsel ... in support of the conclusion
that a Somali clan may constitute a 'particular social group."').
145. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819, 822-23 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding that
service man's homosexuality was grounds for establishment in a special group and that
membership within such group qualified the applicant for asylum).
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ing: criminal deportees, 46 Honduran street children, 4 7 non-criminal
drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel,148 young, attractive
Albanian women forced into prostitution, 149 indigenous people compris-
ing a large percentage of the population of disputed area, 50 mentally ill
Jamaicans or mentally ill female Jamaicans.151
Although these are examples of social groups from various types of
asylum claims, comparing the successfully defined groups against the un-
successfully defined groups illustrates the confusion for gender-based
claims as well; these tightly defined groups can exclude a number of muti-
lated women. There is an unfortunate paradox since a woman has to
"show that she was persecuted at least in part on account of" membership
in a particular social group. 52 However, a woman could claim that her
social group is one of mutilated women, where there is no proof that she
was persecuted because she is a member of a group of mutilated women.
The Fifth Circuit addressed this paradox explaining that it is an "impossi-
bility" for a woman to be a member of a social group "subjected to FGM
prior to the time when she underwent FGM."' 53 The UNHCR instructs
that this ground is usually marked by the persecutor's "confidence in the
group's loyalty.., or the very existence of the social group as such is held
146. Toussaint v. Att'y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that crimi-
nal deportees cannot be categorized under a social group under the dictates of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act); Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 397 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating
that the BIA never intended to apply the term "social group" to invidivuals who engage in
illegal activities).
147. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that characteristics
such as "poverty, homelessness and youth" are too vague to constitute a protected group
under the Immigration and Nationality Act).
148. In re C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (holding that respondent did
not adequately prove that he was persecuted on account of membership within a particular
social group).
149. Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing how "sweep-
ing classifications" do not qualify for purposes of asylum).
150. Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Indigenous people
comprising a large percentage of the population of a disputed area have not been demon-
strated to be a 'social group.'").
151. Raffington v. INS, 340 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2003) (showing various reasons
why the applicant failed to show that she would be "singled out for persecution" based on
her inclusion in a particular social group).
152. Valena Elizabeth Beety, Reframing Asylum Standards for Mutilated Women, 11 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 239, 257 (2008).
153. Kane v. Gonzales, 123 F. App'x 518, 520 (3d Cir. 2005) ("It is a logical impossi-
bility for Kane to have been a member of the social group of women subjected to FGM
prior to the time when she underwent FGM (as a one-week-old infant)."). An asylee must
show that the social group she belongs to was the cause of the persecution and that the
persecution creates the social group. Id.
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to be an obstacle"' 54 The problem is that the focus is on the perspective
of the persecutor, and decision makers are preoccupied on whether inter-
nal perspectives of the group members are equally as relevant. 155 This
can result in the paradox of the "groups being circularly defined by their
common victimization."' 
56
The other side of the paradox, until recently, was that a woman who
had already undergone FGM could not successfully be granted asylum
based on fearing and being resistant to the practice if she had already
been mutilated.'57 Nevertheless, even with the Attorney General clarify-
ing that FGM is not a one-time act,' 58 a woman will need to establish that
the persecution will continue to be inflicted by the group that initially
persecuted her if she is sent back to her country of origin. Why should
women who are not victims of FGM be granted asylum while the women
who have undergone the persecution be left with no relief? The women
all come from communities, tribes or clans that practice FGM. This is a
step backwards from the progress made in In re Kasinga.
One proposed alternative from this quandary is the use of FGM as
political persecution. 5' However, not applying membership in a particu-
lar social group may result in distorted interpretations or imprecise analy-
sis.' 6 ° Generally using the protected ground of membership in a
particular social group requires the applicant to establish her resistance to
FGM along with her membership in the group which has been perse-
cuted.'6 1 In contrast, using political opinion as the protected group only
requires showing the woman's opinion and resistance so that she opposes
154. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND
THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1992), http://www.unhcr.
org/publ/PUBL/3d58el3b4.pdf (noting why membership in a particular social group is
often tied to persecution from a government source).
155. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 378 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999).
156. Id.
157. See In re A-T-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 296, 301 (B.I.A. 2007) ("[T]here is no separate
statutory ground of persecution predicated on an alien's being subjected to FGM.").
158. See id. at 621 ("As several courts have recognized, female genital mutilation is
indeed capable of repetition.").
159. See Valena Elizabeth Beety, Refraining Asylum Standards for Mutilated Women,
11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 239, 259 (2008) ("A woman's opposition to FGM, as well as
her resistance to social control, means mutilating her against her will qualifies as
persecution.").
160. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 381 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999).
161. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) ("[T]he applicant must
establish that her well-founded fear of persecution is 'on account of' one of the five
grounds specified in the Act, here, her membership in a 'particular social group."').
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the practice of FGM and was persecuted because of that opposition. 162
However, this is imprecise because women are not solely persecuted be-
cause they oppose FGM; instead, there are generally additional cultural
and traditional reasons that serve as the impetus for inflicting FGM.
163
B. Social Group Conflict and Other Gender-Based Claims
FGM claims are not the only type of asylum claims where there is diffi-
culty establishing the social group; victims of domestic violence share the
same quandary. 164 FGM and domestic violence claims are both consid-
ered gender-based, and examining the domestic violence-based claim that
has garnered much attention from the asylum community reveals not
only the unfortunate substantive history but also the procedural his-
tory. 165 Hopefully FGM claims may be resolved more effectively and
efficiently.
For example, victims of domestic violence strive to define their social
group while incorporating gender, as shown in In re R-A-. 16 6 Unlike
claims with FGM, involving persecution inflicted on a social group which
has been defined by gender and tribe, domestic violence claims do not
have the same sort of precedent. The claimant in In re R-A- was a Gua-
temalan asylum seeker who was a victim of severe domestic violence.
167
The immigration judge granted asylum finding spousal abuse was on ac-
count of the applicant's gender-defined social group, as well as her politi-
162. See Valena Elizabeth Beety, Refraining Asylum Standards for Mutilated Women,
l J. GENDER RACE & JUsT. 239, 259 (2008) ("To establish persecution based on political
opinion, the applicant must specify her political opinion, and show that she holds that opin-
ion."). Political opinion has a broad interpretation including the treatment and status of
women on account of their country of origin, culture, or social or religious groups. Id.
163. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN
INTERAGENCY STATEMENT 9-14 (2008), http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/publica-
tions/fgm/fgmstatement_2008.pdf.
164. See In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 907 (B.I.A. 1999) ("The question before us
is whether the respondent qualifies as a 'refugee' as a result of the heinous abuse she
suffered and still fears from her husband in Guatemala.").
165. See In re R-A-, 24 I & N Dec. 629, 630 (A.G. 2008) (discussing the extended
case history of woman, a victim of domestic violence, who had been denied a claim for
asylum though she claimed she claimed persecution based on membership on a particular
social group). There was a stay issued by then-Attorney General Janet Reno in 2001 and
the stay was finally lifted and remanded in 2008. Id. at 629.
166. 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 907 (B.I.A. 1999) ("Specifically, we address whether the
repeated spouse abuse inflicted on the respondent makes her eligible for asylum as an alien
who has been persecuted on account of her membership in a particular social group or her
political opinion.").
167. Id. ("The respondent testified that her husband 'always mistreated me from the
moment we were married, he was always ... aggressive."').
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cal opinion. 168 Her social group was "Guatemalan women who have
been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who be-
lieve that women are to live under male domination."' 169 On appeal, the
BIA reversed the ruling because marital status, gender, and nationality
are not acceptable as a social group nexus recognized as "a societal fac-
tion" and that the group was only recognized in the abstract. 170 The BIA
honed in on the idea of gender being too broad of a category and com-
pared that defining category with others also seen as too broad without
ever explaining or proposing what can satisfy a "social group."' 7'
In 2001, then-Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the BIA's decision
in In re R-A- which led to a twisted procedural history where eventually
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) asked Attorney General Reno
to issue a decision instructing the BIA to grant the respondent asylum
without an opinion. 72 Otherwise, Reno could have postponed deciding
until DHS issued final regulations that would govern domestic violence
asylum cases. 173 That was the option she chose, however, as the regula-
tions were never finalized.' 74 Seven years passed without a response on
In re R-A-. Although different persecution was inflicted, establishing a
social group in both cases remain questionable.
On September 28, 2008, Attorney General Mukasey certified In re
R-A- to himself, explaining that decisions issued in the interim by the
BIA may be able to help finally decide In re R-A-. 17' Essentially, his
certification overruled the decision of prior Attorney Generals John Ash-
croft and Janet Reno, both of whom were awaiting the finalization of the
regulations the Justice Department proposed. 76 What the Justice De-
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. ("The respondent in this case has not demonstrated that domestic violence is
as pervasive in Guatemala as FGM is among the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe, or, more im-
portantly, that domestic violence is a practice encouraged and viewed as societally impor-
tant in Guatemala.").
171. See In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. at 907 ("Initially, we find that 'Guatemalan women
who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that
women are to live under male domination' is not a particular social group.").
172. See ANWEN HUGHES, ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL-A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF THE SUnSTANTIVE LAW 293, 308 (Practicing Law Inst. 2005).
173. See id. at 308-09.
174. See generally In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. at 906 (directing the BIA to stay reconsider-
ation of the its earlier decision)
175. In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 631 (A.G. 2008) ("In light of these develop-
ments and the fact that the proposed rule cited by Attorney General Reno never has been
made final, I have decided to lift the stay so that the Board can revisit the issues in In re
R-A- and related cases and issue new decisions.").
176. See Press Release, Ctr. for Gender and Refugee Studies, Univ. of Cal., Hastings
Coll. of Law, New Ruling by Attorney General Mukasey May Endanger Rights of Women
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partment Regulations would have amended are the asylum regulations
"relating to the meaning of the terms, 'persecution,' 'on account of,' and
'particular social group. ' ' 177 In the meantime, numerous court decisions
have been issued addressing various aspects of this area of asylum law.'7 8
Attorney General Mukasey reasons that the BIA should proceed in its
reconsideration of In re R-A- and related cases.' 7 9 Whatever the BIA
decides in both In re A-T- and In re R-A- can set the precedent because
administrative decisions interpreting statutes are given deference by fed-
eral appellate courts.' 8°
In the meantime, immigration judges granted asylum to women fleeing
domestic violence. For instance, a Muslim woman from Morocco was
granted relief after she was abused by her father due to her religious be-
liefs that differed from his own beliefs.' 8 ' This case shows there are ar-
guably other grounds to use when the claimant's construction of
membership in a particular social group is not meaningful enough. But,
the asylum seekers should not have to wait years for their claims to be
adjudicated, nor should they have to struggle when making their claims
because the law is inadequate and unclear in crucial areas.
Obstacles mount with gender-based claims because there is not always
a clear-cut method to approach them. The BIA must address the tension
in the law by applying the social group term using enough flexibility to
protect applicants with gender-based claims, although not too much so as
to extend the definition to a point which forces the social group to be-
come meaningless as a protected ground. In In re Kasinga, the BIA
makes clear that "gender-based, or gender-related, asylum claims within
the 'membership in a particular social group' construct" is entirely appro-
Asylum Seekers (Oct. 2008), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/media/
press%20release/R-A-Mukasey-pressrelease oct_08.pdf (detailing the certification of
asylum for In re R-A-).
177. See generally Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (defining terms needed to establish an
asylum claim).
178. See In re R-A-, 24 1. & N. at 630 ("[I]ntervening decisions may not have directly
resolved the issues presented in In re R-A-, some of them have addressed, for example,
the terms 'persecution,' 'on account of,' and 'particular social group,' and thus may have
relevance to the issues presented with respect to asylum claims based on domestic
violence.").
179. See id. (explaining that the BIA should address not only this case but the numer-
ous other cases that involve claims of domestic violence in applicants' home countries).
180. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (stressing the courts' adherence to the "principle of deference to administrative
interpretations").
181. In re S-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1328, 1329 (B.I.A. 2000) (finding that the woman
suffered persecution because of her religious beliefs, which differed from the beliefs held
by her father).
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priate in American jurisprudence.18 2 Although sex is seen as a "sort of
shared characteristic that could define a particular social group,"1 83 reluc-
tance stems from sex being too broad of a category.' 8 4 However, recog-
nizing only gender in some circumstances can be essential in order to
provide women the same access to relief and protection while avoiding
general interpretive distortions of the refugee definition.1
85
C. Rethinking Social Group as Applied to FGM Victims
Recognizing that women who undergo FGM normally face various
other types of persecution such as rape, forced marriage, honor killings,
and physical and mental abuse is necessary to approach defining mem-
bership in a particular social group for FGM victims. FGM not being a
"one-time" act has been rectified.' 8 6 FGM persecution is often intercon-
nected with other harms.18 7 Therefore, decision makers should appreci-
ate that women who have "one act of gender-related violence" inflicted
upon them also have "related violence within a spectrum of harms" able
to be inflicted upon them from that same culture.' 8 8 What has been es-
tablished is that FGM victims do not qualify as a specific social group
solely based on gender.'8 9 This is the same for women who are seeking
asylum based on having been a victim of domestic violence.' 90 Gender as
particular social group may be too broad into order to meet that criterion.
182. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 377 (B.I.A. 1996).
183. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 388-89 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999).
184. Id. at 389.
185. Id. at 388-89.
186. See In re A-T-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 617, 621 (B.I.A. 2008) (clarifying that FGM is not
a one-time act).
187. See Valena Elizabeth Beety, Refraining Asylum Standards for Mutilated Women,
11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 239, 263-66 (2008) ("Once a woman can claim she suffered
FGM as persecution because she is a woman in a specific culture, she will have the oppor-
tunity to make a claim that she faces future persecution on the same basis, for example,
forced prostitution, forced marriage, further genital mutilation, or economic
persecution.").
188. Id. at 263 (describing how courts should recognize the connection between geni-
tal mutilation and other types of persecution a women from a culture can have inflicted
upon her).
189. See Asad v. Ashcroft, 135 F. App'x 839, 845 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding an applicant
cannot claim that gender combined with ability to find work satisfies a well-founded fear of
persecution); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that gender alone
does not warrant asylum based on classification with a particular social group).
190. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 907 (B.I.A. 1999) ("[Tlhe respondent has
not shown that 'Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan
male companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination' is a group
that is recognized and understood to be a societal faction, or is otherwise a recognized
segment of the population, within Guatemala.").
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However, there must be a middle ground, or some defined criteria for
women who are persecuted in their particular culture. Many scholars
have argued that if gender alone satisfied membership of a particular so-
cial group, then other future harms such as forced marriage, rape, domes-
tic violence and child marriage should be understood since those broader
harms related to gender could be associated with one another.1 9' In
other words, the harms are "on account of" membership in that particular
social group.
Those broader harms related to gender can be understood as an inter-
connection of harms, which moves towards a mixed motive approach for
granting asylum.' 92 Case law established the idea that there is a nexus (or
connection) between the persecution and the protected ground that must
be proven.' 93 The difficulty is that "on account of" is vague, as the defini-
tion evolved from the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees. However, there the term "for reasons of" was used.
194
Later, the Supreme Court defined "on account of" as "because of."' 95
Despite the imprecision of the term, what is clear is that a relationship
must exist between the persecution and the protected ground. That is
what is referred to as the nexus. 19 6 Case law has also construed "mem-
bership in a particular social group" to mean "common immutable char-
acteristic."' 197 The idea of the nexus is the crux of where most of the
191. See Valena Elizabeth Beety, Reframing Asylum Standards for Mutilated Women,
11 J. GENDER RACE & Jusr. 239, 264-65 (2008) (examining the possible outcome if gender
alone became an acceptable basis for an asylum claim). "If gender is openly recognized as
a basis for asylum claims.., then a broader range of harms against women, such as domes-
tic violence, forced marriage, child marriage, rape, sexual slavery, and mutilation, can be
understood as interconnected." Id.
192. See id. (stating that courts should treat FGM in the same manner in which they
treat other asylum claims, "by looking at the basis of the harm, and the interconnection of
the present harm to different potential future harms")
193. See generally INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (holding that in the
instant case the victim did not qualify for asylum because the persecution was occurring
because of the persecutor's political opinion and not because of the victim's political
opinion).
194. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signa-
ture July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
195. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483 (reasoning that Elias-Zacarias had to establish
guerillas would persecute him because of his political opinion).
196. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 268 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999) ("There must be a causal link between the existence of the risk and
the person's protected status or belief.").
197. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (describing an immutable
characteristic as one "that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so
fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to change").
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decisions differ. 98 Without a middle ground, those who deserve protec-
tion are not granted it; this may then add to the numbers of illegal immi-
grants in the country or to the countless women who are subjected to the
continuing persecution in their country of origin simply because the laws
are too vague and misconstrued to serve their true purpose. 9 The fol-
lowing analysis will examine specific reasoning and aspects of the immi-
gration community's approach toward defining "social group" for victims
of FGM. It will also propose new solutions in case any future BIA prece-
dent does not adequately resolve this ongoing tension in the law.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS II
Earlier discussion explains that whatever the BIA concludes when revi-
siting its decision in In re A-T-, is it likely FGM victims may still not
receive protection or proper guidance. An alternative is for Congress to
provide protection through legislation as they did for persons who feared
or underwent coercive population control practices. 200 Various reasons
supporting this alternative will be examined in the remainder of the Com-
ment to show why and how this may be a more practical approach.
A. The Political Nature of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Even though the BIA, as an administrative body, is given deference does
not necessarily mean that the Board's conclusion will provide the best
precedent; this is due to the political nature of the body.20' The way the
198. See generally DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
268-69 (Paul T. Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999).
199. See Shannon Nicholas, American Mutilation: The Effects of Gender-Biased Asy-
lum Laws on the World's Women, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 42, 45 (1997) ("[T]he vague
language defining a 'refugee' under the current asylum law has created inconsistent and
unpredictable judgments.").
200. See 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(B) (2000).
[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary steril-
ization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure
or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to
have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. Id.
Cf De You Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying an application for
asylum because China's family planning policies do not constitute a ground for political
asylum).
201. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum
and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 433 (2007) ("At the court of appeals
level, the Asylum Study found that judges appointed by Democrats appear to vote in favor
of asylum applicants at much higher rates than do judges appointed by Republicans.").
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BIA operates is important since the appointments are political ones con-
trolled by the United States Attorney General.2"2 The BIA is a nonstatu-
tory body created by the Attorney General comprised of fifteen
members.2 "3 The Attorney General has authority to review the BIA de-
cisions, but exercises it sparingly.20 4 In 2002 and 2003, the Attorney Gen-
eral attempted to streamline the BIA to reduce the backlog.2 0 5 In the
past, a three-member panel wrote opinions. 20 6 Now, most decisions are
made by a single person without a written opinion.20 7 Then-Attorney
General John Ashcroft also reassigned five of the original twenty-three
BIA members.2 °8 Subsequent resignations and vacancies account for the
current number of fifteen. 209 An empirical study shows that the members
reassigned have a more favorable record toward noncitizens. 2 't The
make up of the BIA can and will change based on the political climate
and the make up of the Executive branch.
2 11
202. See id. at 418-20 ("Although the ideology-based purge has obvious implications
for the decisional independence of the BIA, the tone and the broad language of the new
regulations has left the future decisional independence of the immigration judges in similar
doubt.").
203. Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals Fact Sheet, www.usdoj.
gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm (last visited May 20, 2009) (stating that the BIA is the highest ad-
ministrative body charged with implementing and interpreting the United States immigra-
tion laws). The BIA is compromised of fifteen members including a Chairman and Vice
Chairman. Id.
204. See Terry Frieden, AG: Don't Deport Genital Mutilation Victim, CNN.COM, Sept.
22, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/09/22/genital.mutiliation.immigrant/in-
dex.html (explaining that the Attorney General has only offered an opinion on three immi-
gration cases in the past three years). The immigration courts decide on average 40,000
cases annually. Id.
205. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and
the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REv. 413, 418 (2007) ("The most visible changes
were those designed to 'streamline' the BIA in order to reduce its large backlog of cases.").
206. See id. at 418-19.
207. See id. at 418-20 ("The new regulation made single member 'affirmances without
opinion' (AWOs) the norm, prohibiting three-member panels and reasoned written opin-
ions except in certain designated categories of cases.").
208. Id. ("Approximately one year after this announcement, the Attorney General
reassigned five BIA members to either nonadjudicative or lower adjudicative positions
within the Justice Department").
209. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 3
(2009), www.usdoj.gov/eoir.
210. See Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration
Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER'S IMMIOR. BULL. No. 19, 1156 (Oct. 1, 2004) ("Mem-
bers inclined to favor the position of noncitizens were particularly vulnerable.").
211. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asy-
lum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 433 (2007) (discussing the diver-
sity of appointees and how this diversity affects differing outcomes in adjudication of
claims).
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Besides the composition of the BIA, the professionalism of the BIA
was called into question in 2006 by United States Attorney General Al-
berto Gonzales after various appellate judges berated the behavior of a
few immigration judges.21 2 The Attorney General responded by review-
ing the immigration courts to create a series of steps afterwards aimed at
improving the adjudicating process and professionalism of the courts.21 3
The comprehensive review was a product of the review which essentially
created oversight, and therefore, eroded the adjudicator's indepen-
dence.214 This change could be seen as an improvement in the immigra-
tion system as well as a warning of a broken system. Either way the
adjudicative system is imperfect to a certain degree. The BIA publishes
opinions as precedent that show the requirements necessary to establish a
successful claim for relief.215 Unfortunately, the BIA's decisions have
been criticized for inconsistency. 216 Asylum claim decisions have sharply
divided the Board in recent times.217 Since the BIA is charged to clarify
ambiguity of the protected ground of membership in a particular social
group, perhaps it should also be refreshed on the many avenues by which
the asylum community has approached the topic. Considering the gui-
dance from the Attorney General as well as taking into account the rea-
soning of the circuit court decisions pertaining to FGM cases is a practical
way to approach defining "social group."
Although the Justice Department Regulations were never issued, the
brief written by the U.S. Justice Department for In re R-A- breaks down
212. Id. at 420 ("[Attorney General Alberto Gonzales] would not release his review
team's findings, but he did announce a series of steps to enhance the professionalism of the
adjudicators.").
213. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines
Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06-ag-520.html.
214. Id.
215. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999) ("The Board's approach to address its case law is markedly fact-
specific; its decisions only infrequently state the kind of general rule or policy that may be
clearly applied to the determination of other similar cases.").
216. See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environ-
ment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433, 447-48 (1992).
217. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 8-9 (Paul T.
Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999) (describing further that there are various other informal adminis-
trative sources that have filled in the gaps in this area of law). Unfortunately, the develop-
ment of asylum law has often been described as "from the bottom up." Id. Immigration
judges are credited with issuing thoughtful decisions and there are other manuals that elab-
orate on the substantive and procedural law where the BIA has not. Id.
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the elements establishing asylum and should be considered as well.2 18
Congress has also voiced concerns over the BIA's decisions on In re
A-T-. 2 19 Public officials who represent citizens of this country could also
be taken into account. Members of the BIA may be the experts on the
matter but they should not address this topic without understanding other
reasoning besides their own, especially now that their decision has been
vacated based on flawed application of their own laws.
B. "Refugee" Definition to Include Forced Sterilization
Protection to those persons who have undergone or feared undergoing
forced sterilization due to coercive population control measures have not
always been protected in the United States. For example, in Chen v. INS,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a BIA decision denying asy-
lum to a male Chinese citizen whose sought to avoid persecution on ac-
count of China's "one couple, one child policy.' ' 22 ° The court deferred to
the BIA decision pursuant to the principle of administrative deference
and held "that the petitioner's refusal to comply with [China's] one child
per couple policy did not constitute an expression of political opinion. "221
Chen argued that some decisions had been overruled by subsequent ad-
ministrative action and also by an Executive Order.2 22 Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Moreover, the court did
not find there was a violation of Chen's human right to procreate as pro-
tected under the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, since a
violation of that right is not recognized under the grounds for asylum as
listed in the INA.2 23 In this case, there was no avenue for relief whatso-
218. Department of Homeland Security's Position on Respondent's Eligibility for Re-
lief at 5-7, In re R.A., No. A73 753 922 (A.G. Feb. 19, 2004), available at http://cgrs.uc
hastings.edu/documents/legal/dhsbriefra.pdf (discussing the elements necessary to estab-
lish a claim for asylum).
219. See Letter from Olympia J. Snowe & Carl Levin, U.S. Senators, to Michael B.
Mukasey, U.S. Attorney General, (Apr. 25, 2008); see also Letter from Chairman John
Conyers Jr. and Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, U.S. House of Representatives Committee
of the Judiciary Committee to Michel B. Mukasey, U.S. Attorney General (Sept. 23, 2008),
available at http://lofgren.house.gov/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1879.
220. De You Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying a application for
asylum because China's family planning policies do not constitute a ground for political
asylum).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 802 (detailing Chen's attempt to persuade the court that prior administra-
tive action and an executive order evidence that a prior BIA decision regarding the PRC's
family planning policies as a ground for political asylum has been overruled).
223. Id. at 806 (indicating that the court believed that Chen failed to show how a
denial of the right to procreate could fall under the protected grounds listed in the INA).
[Vol. 11:577
ASYLUM LAW AND FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
ever if someone feared forced sterilization or other population control
methods.
This line of thinking abruptly ended in 1996 when legislation altered
the definition of refugee to include these individuals who "are deemed to
have been persecuted or to have a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of their political opinion. '224 This legislation, the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act2 25 (IIRAIRA), is
known for the significant revision to U.S. asylum law since the Refugee
Act.226 The amended definition makes it easier for individuals because
those who qualify do not have the burden of establishing that they were
being persecuted on account of their political opinion,2 27 nor must they
establish that they have a well-founded fear, since that is not needed
under the law. Instead, the law assumes those criteria. Furthermore,
spouses of individuals who have been forced to undergo population con-
trol procedures have been granted asylum by the BIA and federal courts,
although this is not automatic.22 8 Qualifying persons are now protected
in a comprehensive manner.
C. Comparing FGM Claims to Forced Sterilization Claims
The BIA suggests that a past infliction of FGM will be granted asylum
if Congress directed the Board to do so. 22 9 The B[A's opinion in In re
A-T-, although now vacated and remanded by the Attorney General,
224. See REGINA GERMAIN, AILA's ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACICAL GUIDE 10 U.S.
ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 55 (5th ed. 2007) (explaining the revised definition of refu-
gee in IIRAIRA to provide for those who are subject to coercive population control).
225. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted
as Division C of Omnibus Consolidated-Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
226. See REGINA GERMAIN, AILA's ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE [O U.S.
ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 12 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the new provisions included
in IIRAIRA).
227. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(B); 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(B)
(2006).
[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary steril-
ization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure
or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to
have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. Id.
228. See Qili Qu v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting asylum to
the applicant based on his wife having been forcibly sterilized by Chinese authorities).
229. See In re Y-T-L-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 601, 606-08 (B.I.A. 2003) ("It is manifestly
clear that Congress intended to make eligible for asylum those who were victims of China's
coercive family planning policy ....").
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addresses the comparison of FGM to forced sterilization made by the
Ninth Circuit in Mohammed v. Gonzales.2 30 In In re Y-T-L-, 3 1 which is
a BIA opinion that granted asylum based on Congress's amended defini-
tion of refugee, the BIA explained that forced sterilization and abortion
are an exception to what constituted "continuing persecution" since they
are singled out in the refugee definition on the strength of the past harm
alone.2 32 Moreover, the BIA reasoned that holding otherwise would
have contradicted Congress's purpose.23 3 If Congress gave direction via a
statute specifically to the issue of FGM, the BIA would be obligated to
apply it without any dilemma. Perhaps Congress intervening would alle-
viate any further misinterpretation of the regulatory framework when the
Board addresses its next task of addressing membership in a particular
social group for FGM victims.
D. Federal Efforts Made Against Female Genital Mutilation
Legislation allowing for FGM victims to seek asylum would parallel the
current viewpoint in United States law and would fall in line with steps
already taken by the government. In the United States, female genital
mutilation is a punishable offense.2 34 The United States outlaws per-
forming FGM on persons less than 18 years of age.2 35 Anyone who com-
mits FGM on another person who is under the age of 18 years old will be
fined or imprisoned for up to 5 years.2 36 An exception allows surgical
procedures performed by a licensed medical practitioner for medical pur-
poses or related to child birth.2 37 Cultural defenses based on beliefs or
230. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 799-801 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing
FGM persecution claims as similar to sterilization persecution claims).
231. 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (B.I.A. 2003).
232. In re Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601, 605-06 (B.I.A. 2003) (noting that the respon-
dent has no reason to fear this form of persecution based on the fact that he has already
been persecuted, but also realizing the "special nature" of the persecution at issue).
233. Id. at 607-08 (discussing the intent of Congress "regarding the eligibility for asy-
lum of past victims of coercive family planning practices"); see 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (1997) (defining discretionary referral or denial of asylum claims
based on a fundamental change in circumstances of the applicant).
234. 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006) (listing penalties for engaging in any act constituting fe-
male genital mutilation upon a minor).
235. Id. (imposing a fine or imprisonment or both for engaging in female genital muti-
lation of a minor).
236. Id.
Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly circumcises, excises, or in-
fibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of an-
other person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. Id.
237. Id. § 116(b)(1)-(2).
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customs permit no exception.238 In addition, sixteen states in the United
States have adopted laws regarding FGM, most of which were enacted
between 1996 and 1999.239 Those states are California, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.24 °
Along with those measures, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) was directed by provisions in federal law to compile data
on the practice of FGM for educational purposes in relevant communi-
ties.241 The data specifically gathered numbers of families in the United
States who have been subjected to FGM either in the United States or in
242 aloranother country. It also required data on communities within the
United States where the practice is prevalent.243 HHS then distributed
information on how to handle complications due to the procedure.24 4
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention also stated that an esti-
238. Id. § 116(c).
239. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.4 (West 1996); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 124170 (1996); COLO. REV. STAr. § 18-6-401 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 780
(1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAr. 5/12-34 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-601
(1998) (making it illegal to perform FGM; to consent to a procedure for a minor; or even
to consider custom or ritual as a justification for the practice); MINN. STAT § 609.2245(1)
(1996) (labeling it a crime to perform a female genital mutilation); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 568.065 (2000) (codifying genital mutilation of a female child as a class B felony); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.5083 (1997) (spelling out the penalties for mutilating the genitalia of a
female child); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.85 (McKinney 1997) (using the same language as the
Maryland statute, as in making FGM illegal in practice and by parental consent); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-36-01 (1995) (classifying the offense of genital mutilation as "any per-
son who knowingly separates or surgically alters normal, healthy, functioning genital tissue
of a female minor"); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.207 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-2 (2002);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-110 (1996); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 167.001
(Vernon 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D-3a (West 1999) ("[A]ny person who circum-
cises, excises or infibulates ... the labia majora, labia minora or clitoris of a female under
the age of eighteen . . . shall be guilty of a penalty."); WIs. STAT. § 146.35 (1995) ("[N]o
person may circumcise, excise or infibulate the labia minora or clitoris of a female
minor.").
240. See generally CTR. FOR REPRODUCrIVE RIGHTS, LEGISLATION ON FEMALE GENI-
TAL MUTILATION IN THE UNITED STArES 5-10 (2004), http://reproductiverights.org/sites/
default/files/documents/pub-bp-fgmlawsusa.pdf (listing the various states and their respec-
tive legislation relating to FGM).
241. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-134, § 520, 110 Stat. 1321-250
(1996) (stating that the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall compile certain data
regarding females in the United States that have undergone FGM).
242. Id. § 520(b)(1).




mated 168,000 females have undergone or are at risk for FGM.245 A pro-
vision in the IIRAIRA enacted in 1996 also directed the Department of
State to make available information to aliens in the United States of the
harm FGM may cause as well as the legal consequences of performing
the procedure in the United States.246
In 1997, when Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Spending
Bill, it included appropriations for many efforts, including FGM.247 One
of the provisions prohibited international financial institutions from pro-
viding loans to FGM practicing countries where there was no effort by
local governments to educate on preventing the practice.2 48 All of these
measures taken by both the states and the federal government express a
commitment to alleviating the practice in the United States. FGM asy-
lum provisions included in United States law would demonstrate that the
United States is truly committed not only to preventing FGM in our
country but also providing protection to those already inflicted.
The 100th Congress participated in the ongoing debate surrounding
FGM asylum applicants. 49 On January 28, 2008, the House Judiciary
Committee Chairman John Conyers (Democrat-Michigan) and commit-
tee member Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren (Democrat-California) sent a
letter to Attorney General Mukasey addressing their concern about the
BIA's recent decision in In re A-T- that appears to "reverse U.S. policy
regarding the protection of women subjected to severe human rights
abuses such as female genital mutilation (FGM). ' '25° In addition, Sena-
tors Olympia Snowe (Republican-Maine) and Carl Levin (Democrat-
Michigan) sent a letter to the Attorney General requesting review of the
245. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTs, LEGISLATION ON FEMALE GENITAL MUTILA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2004), http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/
pub-bp_fgmlawsusa.pdf.
246. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, en-
acted as Division C of Omnibus Consolidated-Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
1997,Pub. L. 104-208, § 644, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101).
247. 22 U.S.C. § 262k-2(b) (2006) (opposing any loan or distribution of funds to any
government known to practice FGM).
248. See id. The legislation lists the financial institutions to include "the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, the Asian Development Fund, the African Development Bank,
the African Development Fund, the International Monetary Fund, the North American
Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development." Id.
249. H.R.J. Res. 32, 110th Cong. (2007) (introducing female genital mutilation as an
important human rights issue requiring national attention).
250. Letter from Chairman John Conyers Jr. and Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, U.S.
House of Representatives Committee of the Judiciary Committee, to Michael B. Mukasey,
U.S. Attorney General (Sept. 23, 2008) (regarding the Board of Immigration Appeal's de-
cision in In re A-T-).
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decision since "in essence, the BIA's reasoning in this case condones the
abhorrent practice of performing FGM. ''25' Furthermore, in 2007, the
House of Representatives passed a resolution unanimously condemning
FGM as a "barbaric practice, 252 and in 2008, the Senate passed a resolu-
tion directing funds to the United Nations Population Fund that works to
end female genital mutilation.253 Congress now has the ability to assert
its legislative authority by enacting a bill to grant asylum to FGM victims.
While debating the various facets of our immigration policy, FGM pro-
visions may be included in any future reforms. In recent years, both the
House and Senate proposed immigration reform measures, but have yet
have come to a consensus. 254 Immigration reform remains a concern for
all Americans. Handling the undocumented immigrant population gar-
ners most debate. 5  Further amending the definition of refugee to in-
clude FGM is a practical route to explore. For example, the Immigration
and Nationality Act could read:
"For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has
been forced to undergo [female genital mutilation] or abort a preg-
nancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been perse-
cuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed
to have been persecuted on account of political opinion or [member-
251. Letter from Olympia J. Snowe & Carl Levin, U.S. Senators, to Michael B.
Mukasey, U.S. Attorney General, (Apr. 25, 2008) (regarding the Board of Immigration
Appeal's decision in In re A-T-).
252. H.R.J. Res. 32, 110th Cong. (2007) ("Denouncing the practices of female genital
mutilation, domestic violence, 'honor' killings, acid burning, dowry deaths, and other gen-
der-based persecutions and expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that par-
ticipation, protection, recognition, and independence of women is crucial to achieving a
just, moral, and honorable society."). "The United States should renew consideration of
and ratify its signature on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women (CEDAW)." Id.
253. S. 2682, 110th Cong. (2007) (directing that United States provide funding to the
United Nations Population Fund, which "carries out activities in more than 150 countries
to reduce maternal mortality and morbidity, end female genital mutilation and cutting,
reduce transmission of STIs and HIV/AIDS, and ensure access to health care and essential
supplies for women and families impacted by emergencies.").
254. Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S.
1348, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing legal status and a path to legal citizenship for the
approximately 12 million illegal immigrants currently residing in the United States); see
Carrie Budoff Brown, Backroom Immigration Deal Emerges, POLITICO, May 17, 2007,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0507/4066.html (discussing a bill that would grant le-
gal status to approximately 12 million illegal immigrants in the United States).
255. See generally Carrie Budoff Brown, Immigration Debate Roils Anew, POLITICO,
Sept. 25, 2007, http:l/www.politico.com/news/stories/O907/5996.html (recognizing that the
immigration debate focuses on whether legislative measures are a type of amnesty).
2009]
THE SCHOLAR
ship in a particular social group], and a person who has a well
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a proce-
dure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of political opinion or [membership in a particular social
group]. 256
In fact, a provision limiting the number of FGM victims could be in-
cluded as to not overwhelm the United States population. Perhaps then
the BIA would not face future dilemmas of working outside of its regula-
tory framework. Moreover, Congress would be taking a stand in support
of basic human rights and victims of FGM would be given a protection
under the United States asylum law so as to alleviate the obstacles wo-
men currently face in other claims based in whole or in part on gender.
V. CONCLUSION
FGM is usually performed on girls between the ages of 7 and 10 years
old.257 Elder women in the community typically perform the procedure
without properly sterilized equipment.258 There are both immediate and
long-term health consequences from the procedure. 9 Initially, there is
heavy bleeding that can possibly lead to hemorrhaging. Severe pain lasts
for days or weeks. Throughout a lifetime, complications include chronic
infections, pain during sexual intercourse, infertility, and problems during
pregnancy.260 Not to mention that some women also have trouble sleep-
ing and disturbance of mood.26' Customs and traditions, control of a wo-
man's sexuality, religion, and social pressure are all justifications given by
the societies where the practice is prevalent. 262 Communities using cus-
toms and tradition as a justification claim that FGM aids in continuing
cultural identity. 263 Controlling a woman's sexuality stems from a desire
256. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
For illustrative purposes, I am offering an example of how the wording of the current
statute could be amended to provide for protection of an FGM victim.
257. United Nations Population Fund, Frequently Asked Questions on Female Geni-
tal Mutilation/Cutting, www.unfpa.org/gender/practices2.htm#8 (last visited May 11, 2009).
258. Id. ("FGM[ ] is usually carried out by elderly people in the community (usually,
but not exclusively, women) who have been specially designated for this task.").
259. WORLD HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN IN-
TERAGENCY STATEMENT 11 (2008), http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/publications/
fgm/fgm-statement_2008.pdf.
260. Id.
261. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, LEGISLATION ON FEMALE GENITAL MUTILA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2004), http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub-bp-fgm
lawsusa.pdf.
262. Id. at 1-2.
263. Id..
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to reduce a woman's sexual fulfillment.264 While religion is often cited as
a justification for FGM, it is not religious but cultural. 265 The cultures
span Christians, Jews, Muslims along with many other indigenous reli-
gions in Africa, but the religions' beliefs do not include it. 266 Where most
women are subjected to this treatment, the environment creates pressure
to continue the practice for social acceptance. 267
The bottom line of this dilemma is that these women who have been
brutally harmed in ways that are outlawed in the United States deserve
relief provided by the asylum laws established in our country. However,
an easy answer or resolution does not currently exist. This is in part due
to the definition of refugee one must satisfy when making his or her asy-
lum claim. The various protected groups listed do not include one specifi-
cally for gender or sex. Membership in a particular social group is
arguably the most applicable ground. 268 The tension is between its inclu-
sion in the original definition with the purpose of providing an avenue for
those not protected by the other grounds combined with decision makers'
narrow application of the definition. The irony is that "membership in a
particular social group" is not fully serving its intended purpose, and the
ones bearing the brunt of its misuse are the applicants dreaming of a bet-
ter future in this country who have suffered more abuse, mistreatment,
violence and persecution than most could ever imagine. After making
their claims, they are denied a chance of protection and freedom.
Finding the solution to this quandary should not be left solely to the
BIA as they address what membership in a particular social group should
mean or how it should be defined. This is partly because the Board will
respond using what membership in a particular social group has meant in
subsequent case law as well as how the BIA interprets its regulatory
framework. And up to this point, none of that history has adequately
provided a workable definition for the applicants or a definition that deci-
sion makers apply without struggling. 269 Rather, resolving the social
group paradox for women who have undergone FGM requires the help of
264. Id.
265. Id. at 4.
266. CTR. FOR REPRODUCrIVE RIGHTS, LEGISLATION ON FEMALE GENITAL MUTILA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2004), http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub-bp-fgm
lawsusa.pdf.
267. Id. at 2.
268. See generally JOSEPH A. VAIL, ESSENTIALS OF REMOVAL AND RELIEF REPRE-
SENTING INDIVIDUALS IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 154-57 (2006).
269. See generally Gerald P. Seipp, A Year in Review: Circuit Courts Continue Their
Activist Role on Behalf of Asylum Applicants, 85 INTERPRETER RELEASE 2237, 2242 (Aug.
18, 2008) ("[Tlhe courts continue to issue precedential decisions on various scenarios in-
volving claimed past persecution and/or a reasonable fear of future persecution predicated
on subjection to female genital mutilation.").
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the entire immigration community. When examining who the immigra-
tion community includes, Congress cannot be overlooked as they have
passed various bills reforming immigration laws.2 70
Congress's past enactment of legislation protecting those who have un-
dergone forced population control measures and its current engagement
with the FGM issue shows Congress's willingness to ensure the humane
treatment of people throughout the world suffering due to the denial of
basic human rights. The women who have undergone FGM desire an
opportunity to give back to a society that hopefully fights to help them
end their long journey to a safe livelihood. They came here because for
them it was a matter of life and death. Granting asylum to them legalizes
their status in the United States so that they do not contribute to the
rising number of thousands of undocumented aliens.
Remember the FGM victim from Mali, Ms. Traore? These FGM vic-
tims are like Ms. Traore who came to the United States in October of
2000 and subsequently applied for asylum and withholding of removal.27 '
She underwent FGM when she was a young child where her vulva and
clitoris were removed in her home country of Mali. 27 2 Her father also
arranged for her to marry her first cousin upon her return to Mali.27 3 She
fears what will happen if she does not comply with her father's wishes.
274
Many cultures that practice FGM also believe in honor killings when wo-
men act in ways where the family is shamed within their culture. At the
very least, women are regularly beaten and abused for acting against the
family's direction. Ms. Traore managed to escape the misery she was sub-
jected to and came to the United States only to be rejected in part be-
cause the courts could not sufficiently apply the meaning of membership
in a particular social group. This is crucial to her claim because the perse-
In a rather remarkable decision, issued in June 2008, the Second Circuit pronounced,
in Bah v. Mukasey [involving three consolidated cases], that FGM is a continuing
harm, analogous to forced abortion or sterilization, thereby constituting persecution
on account of a social group defined by their past subjection to this practice. The
court explicitly overruled the Board's precedent decision, In re A-T-, which ruled to
the contrary. Id. (footnotes omitted).
270. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
enacted as Division C of Omnibus Consolidated-Appropriations Act for Fiscal year 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 11 Stat. 3009; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, (USA PA-
TRIOT ACT) Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, §101(a)(B)(iii), 119 Stat.
231, 302-03 (2005) (establishing a totality of the circumstances test for asylum decisions).
271. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 296 (B.I.A. 2007), vacated, 24 1. & N. Dec. 617
(A.G. 2008).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 297.
274. Id.
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cution she has faced and will face must be on account of her membership
in a particular social group. Now, Congress has the opportunity to fight
for this group of women that includes Ms. Traore. Some may even say
that Congress has an obligation to help this group of women. After all,
our nation was founded by another group of strong-willed individuals es-
caping persecution.

